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The Fishbein and Ajzen reasoned action model is briefly introduced and some thoereucal aspects
of the model are discussed Based on a critical analysis of the act and behavioral category concepts
in their model an alternative concept 'behavioral field*, is introduced. A behavioral field is defined
as 'the total of acts that are perceived by the acting individual as leading to a common goal or
valued state' Then a distinction is made between goal acts and instrumental acts. Goal acts lead to
goal attainment Instrumental acts will bring the individual into the direction of his goal It is
argued that for acts that are predominantly instrumental other substitutable acts are available. The
choice between substitutable instrumental acts is governed by both expected outcomes and the
behavioral costs attached to the acts Behavioral costs are defined as the behavioral price relative
to the behavioral budget The behavioral price is determined by the time, psychic and physical task
demand The behavioral budget is a function of the goal importance of the behavioral field Some
further aspects of behavioral costs are then ^frfrvftrd Several arguments to treat costs and
outcomes separately in the explanation of behavior, are elaborated Then some implications from
the behavioral cost concept are drawn for attitude theory 'nnatiy the entangling of costs and value
is briefly discussed
1. Introduction
Since the often cited finding of LaPiere (1934), that restaurant owners
with a negative attitude toward receving Chinese quests nevertheless did
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receive them, there has been an abundance of studies on the relation-
ship between attitudes and behavior (See e.g., Heider 1946; DeFleur
and Westie 1963; Fishbein and Ajzen 1972; Gross and Niman 1975;
Silberer 1982). The Fishbein and Ajzen model on reasoned action can
be seen as a culmination of this development. The model has stimulated
a lot of research efforts. In the present article a number of issues with
regard to the Fishbein and Ajzen model will be discussed. From an
analysis of the content of acts versus behavior, the concept of behav-
ioral costs is introduced and some consequences for attitude research
are delineated.
2. The Fishbein and Ajzen model: some theoretical issues
Fishbein and Ajzen's model has the purpose of contributing to the
understanding and prediction of behavior. It can be represented in the




In the model it is supposed that, the intention (BI) to perform a certain
behavior (B ) is a function of the weighted (wj attitude (Fishbein and
Ajzen define attitude as affect) toward performing a behavior (A^)
and the weighted (w2) Subjective Norm (SN) (formula 1). A behavioral
intention is seen as consisting of a personal and a social component.
The attitude toward a behavior is a function of the expected conse-
quences or outcomes of behavior (beliefs «• bt) and the evaluations of
these expected consequences or outcomes (e{) (formula 2).
The Subjective Norm in the model is a function of social norms to
perform a behavior (nbj) and the motivation to comply with these
norms (me,) (formula 3). If no unanticipated circumstances occur, a
behavioral intention will be converted into corresponding behavior.
*
!
T.M.M. VerhaUen, R.G.M Pteters / Attitude theory 9 5
In studies on attitude-behavior relationships the behavioral part has
received almost no attention. There is some discussion on self-reports
of attitudes and behavior. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Geller (1981)
present results that raise doubt on the validity of self-reports as an
instrument to investigate intra-individual antecedents of behavior. Rip
(1980) and Wright and Rip (1980) do however hold a remarkably more
positive opinion in this respect. In "other-variables9 studies there has
been discussion on the behavioral side of the attitude-behavior rela-
tionship (Wicker 1971; Sheth 1974; Van Raaij and Verhallen 1983b).
The place and status of behavior within the theoretical framework of
Fishbein and Ajzen ha§ however not been singled out as a topic of
discussion.
Starting from an analysis of the behavior concept in the Fishbein
model, the necessity to incorporate a behavioral cost concept in the
model is stressed.
3. Behavior in attitude-behavior relationships in Fishbein and Ajzen's
Reasoned Action Model
Behavior is used to refer to observable acts that are studied in their own
right (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975: 13). Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 29)
stress that in many studies often no distinction is made between
behavior and the outcome of behavior. E.g. the amount of energy
conserved by a household within a specific time period is the outcome
of behavior (and other factors) and not referring to the behavior itself.
Behavior is divided into single acts and behavioral categories (Ajzen
and Fishbein 1980).
A single act is a specific behavior that is performed by the individual.
A behavioral category is a set of actions which have at least one
consequence or outcome in common, e.g., recreation behavior, dieting.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) discuss three general priteria to study
behavior: a single action criterion, a multiple choice criterion and a
behavioral category criterion. A single action criterion comprises the
measurement of a single act. A multiple choice criterion can be treated
as a set of acts of which only one can be performed. A common
example is voting on either the Republican party or the Democratic
party. Behavioral categories cannot be observed directly. They have to
be inferred from specific acts. It is for instance not possible to observe
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recreation behavior directly. A number of acts have to be selected and
combined into one general measure, an index. Such a multiple act index
is a criterion for a behavioral category.
3.1. Behavioral elements: action, target, context and time
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) describe the conditions for the observation
of a significant relationship of attitudes and behavior. Attitudes and
behavioral entities consist of four elements: (1) the action, (2) the target
at which the action is directed, (3) the context in which the action is to
be performed and (4) the point in time when the action is performed.
The content of these elements might be either general or specific. A
significant relationship between attitude and behavior could not be
observed unless both the attitude and the behavioral entity correspond
with regard to those four elements.
For a single act at least the action and target have correspond with
the attitude. The other two elements preferably do correspond too.
They are however not necessary. Some behavioral elements are diffult
to distinguish.
For instance context and target or target and action elements are
mentioned by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977: 911). Take for instance the
attitude toward having an extensive breakfast. What is the object here?
In such a case time, context and target are intertwined. In fact a fifth
element is sometimes distinguished. The reference to the person him-
self, the actor should be taken into account. Such a reference is
considered as essential in cases of attitudes toward brith control,
smoking and drinking (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977: 912). Ahtola (1977)
suggests that such a reference always should be made.
3.2. Some issues with regard to the Fishbein and Ajzen's concept of
behavior
3.2.1. The specification-generalization dilemma
By specifying the four behavioral elements (action, target, context
and time) in order to achieve a maximum correspondence between
attitudes and actions, possible disturbing factors in" the attitude-behav-
ior relationship are defined in such a specific way that the amount of
overlap between the mental and the corresponding behavioral level is
minimized. In this view as soon as an aspect of the context changes, the
attitude may not be relevant anymore.
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The generality, stability and the enduring character of the attitude
concept is*sacrificed to gain predictive power.
A problem associated with specifying an attitude is how to deal with
the context in which the attitude-act relationship is valid. Should the
context be defined in an exhaustive way, for instance according to
Krupat (1977) as social, physical and temporal or according to Belk
(1975) as comprising a task definition, a temporal perspective, antece-
dent states, a physical and a social environment, then the measurement
of the attitude and the corresponding act almost becomes identical. The
attitude-act relationship is reduced to a mere tautology.
A second aspect of the attitude-act specification requirements should
be mentioned. If we have to measure an attitude for each of the
thousands of adts (see Barker 1980) an individual performs each day,
we should be endlessly repeating attitude-act studies, every time with a
somewhat different act. Olshavsky (1982) criticizes such an approach of
Warshaw (1980).
Thirdly, it is questionable whether such a specific act is still an object
of human reasoning. For example Ehrenberg (1974) and Lastovicka and
Bonfield (1982) assert the non-existence of brand attitudes in many
instances.
3.2.2. Multiple choice act
A multiple choice act is a specific form of a single act The different
choice alternatives are presented as possible targets or actions. The
main difference between a multiple choice act and a single act is that in
the latter case both target and action are defined while in the first case
only the action or the target is defined. The different possibilities are
offered as substitutes. As it is not clear whether there are differences in
the theoretical model, with regard to both kinds of acts, we consider
them as mere operational differences.
3.2.3. Behavioral category
A behavioral category can be studied with the help of the multiple
act criterion. The single acts in a behavioral category have at least one
consequence in common. This common consequence, for instance diet-
ing, is what we label as the behavioral category. It is often difficult to
assess whether an act has a certain consequence. The consequence of an
act might only be inferred from the context in which it occurs. Picking
up a wallet is only altruistic if it belongs to someone else, and is
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returned, if there was no large reward for giving it back, and if there
was no strbng social pressure.
To ascertain whether an act belongs to a behavioral category a
number of criteria can be used. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) remark that
a sufficient level of interrater reliability should exist to determine
whether an act belongs to a specific behavioral category.
What we however need is a content criterion to determine whether an
act belongs to a behavioral category. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980: 32)
agree that the consequence of an act has to be recognized by the
individual himself. They also add that this intentionality must be
present when performing that act. A person drinking coffee without
sugar because he likes coffee better in that way cannot be considered to
be dieting. It will be necessary to assess the individual intention instead
of relying on judges before concluding that an act belongs to a specific
behavioral category.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) combine several single acts into a multiple
act index by simply counting them. This multiple act index represents
the behavioral category.
Some questions can be raised with regard to the multiple act index.
(a) Counting single acts implies that all acts are considered to be
equally important. To take the example of dieting: Does it make sense
to add the act 'skipping lunch' to acts such as 'not taking sugar in
coffee or tea'?
n
B= £ (actyx weight,) (4)
> - i • • . • ' • - ' . ' • • ' • ' . : ' ; . . - ^ ; - h ' - -
The formula (4) closely resembles the evaluation x belief formula for
attitudes. The weights in formula (4) are commonly set equal to one. In
discussions with regard to the behavioral category criterion, the same
issues may be raised as with regard to the additive linear-compensatory
character of the Fishbein model.
In our opinion the acts have to be weighted with either an intra-indi-
vidual criterion or an extra-individual criterion. An intra-individual
criterion might be e.g. perceived importance of the act of the effort
needed in performing. As an extra-individual criterion for dieting the
amount of calories saved could be taken.
(b) By simply adding acts, uni-dimensionality is implied. It is assumed
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that acts do not covary. Especially in cases like dieting specific patterns
of behavitfr do occur. The different acts within a diet will strongly
covary. Since people normally behave in a coherent, pattern-like way,
we should focus on trying to explain these patterns of behavior (Van
Raaij and Verhallen 1983b).
4. Toward a behavioral field approach
From the foregoing discussion of behavior in the context of attitude-be-
havior relationships two related problems emerge. The specification-
generalization dilemma with regard to the prediction of acts and the
wish to find m&re enduring and longer lasting relations, point in the
direction of studying larger behavioral entities. In studies on personal-
ity, concepts at an intermediate level of abstraction are considered to be
most parsimonious (Mishell 1979). Among others Olson (1982) and
Verhallen and De Nooij (1982) advocate a more holistic approach in
the study of consumer behavior.
In studies on attitudes the broadening of the scope of the behavior
measure is also advocated. Wtigel and Newman (1976) find the atti-
tude-behavior correspondence to be higher for broader behavior mea-
sures than for specific acts. However Monson et al.*s (1982) study
suggests that it would be premature to abandon the attempt to predict
single acts. It has also been argued that the study of attitudes should
encompass both specific as well as general measures. 'Both specific and
general attitudes ought to be included in a study to predict behavior,
and the entire causal model from general attitudes to specific attitudes
to behavior ought to be charged* (Heberlein and Black 1976; 479).
In the behavioral model of Van Raaij and Verhallen both specific
and general attitudes are represented. Justifying this inclusion they
mention (Van Raaij and Verhallen 1983a: 52): /general attitudes may
provide a general context shaping more specific and critical factors9. In
the following we will discuss the type of behavior entity that corre-
sponds with a broader attitude measure. We start from Ajzen and
Fishbein's concept of a behavior category but introduce a new concept
'behavioral field' which leads to a distinction of different kinds of acts.
It will further be argued that the distinction between these types of acts
leads to the inclusion of a behavioral cost concept in attitude research.
The relevance of this behavioral cost concept is further discussed.
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Behavioral
category
Fig. 2. Behavioral category versus behavioral field.
Finally the implications for a attitude research in general, and more
specific consequences for the Fishbein and Ajzen model are elaborated.
4.L Behavioral category versus behavioral field
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) do not make an attempt to define a
behavioral category. By way of the multiple-act criterion a number of
acts are counted. Which are considered by judges to belong to the same
category. The examples given, e.g., dieting, imply that the selected acts
share a common goal or valued state. Whether individuals strive toward
the particular goal or valued state and whether that is the reason why
they act as they do, can only be stated by the individuals themselves.
'Drinking coffee without sugar' may be a goal in itself, desirable for the
individual: 'the best taste of coffeeV However it might as well be an act
directed at the goal 'dieting*. We will therefore define a behavioral field
as: * the total of acts that are perceived by the acting individual as
leading to a common goal or valued state' [2]. The difference between a
behavioral category and a behavioral field is depicted in fig. 2.
A behavioral category, as mentioned by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980),
is the total of acts that have a common label or that are related to a
[2] This definition of a behavioral field resembles the conception of an "evoked set". Two
additional specification dements have to be taken into account when comparing an evoked set
with a behavioral field. That is a behavioral field can be defined as an evoked set of behavioral
alternatives with comparable goal valences.
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common goal or valued end state. The multiple-act criterion is then
defined asvthe subset of acts that is considered, witH a certain level of
interrater reliability, to represent the behavioral category.
A behavioral field is that subset of acts within the behavioral
category which is defined by the acting individual as leading to the
same goal. What is the relevance of this distinction? As we assume that
a behavioral category as defined by the individual will be guiding his or
her behavior, several other factors now become relevant: the knowledge
of actions that lead to this goal will determine which acts will be
performed by the individual. De Jonge and Oppedijk van Veen (1982)
speak of cognitive events as intervening between behavioral intentions
and actual behavior to include "change of mind' or forgetting. The
occurrence of these cognititve events will be a function of the knowl-
edge [3] of which act belong to the behavioral category. The more
complete the knowledge, the less likely the occurrence of such cognitive
events will be, as there will be less room for surprises.
Furthermore it is possible that the individual is valuing a certain
state (e.g. energy being conserved) and not acting as outside judges
would expect. If the valued state is located outside the individual, as
with energy conservation, a person may follow an indirect way, for
instance, if the individual is not saving energy himself in order to force
others, e.g. the government, to act. So the valued state will be attained
by not performing energy conservation acts.
When having to predict the occurrence of an act within a behavioral
category, when comparing with a single act, it is relevant whether the
person is aware that the act under study leads to the goal or valued
state that governs the behavioral field. When comparing behavioral
categories with a goal directed as a state outside the individual, such as
'energy conservation', with behavioral categories with a goal directed at
a state inside the individual, such as 'dieting', it is relevant whether the
person accepts the responsibility to perform certain acts in this behav-
ioral field.
The acceptance of responsibility might be of importance in studying,
e.g. helping behavior (Schwartz 1977) or ecological behavior (Van Raaij
and Verhallen 1983a). A behavioral field approach in studying
attitude-behavior relationships may explain the relevance of factors
[3] Knowledge is here to be defined as the sum of relational descriptive beliefs (Fisbbein 1967).
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such as 'past of personal experience' (Bentler and Speckart 1979; Scott
1981; Borgida and CampbeU 1982) and 'locus of control' (Zanna et al.
1980). It also brings forward the question whether acts as single acts are
identical to acts within a behavioral category.
4.2. Goal acts versus instrumental acts
In the discussion of the behavior concept of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980),
no reference is made toward a distinction of kinds of acts. The
differences discussed are only differences in formats. In animal psy-
chology a distinction is made between consummatory responses and
instrumental responses (Premack 1971). For reasoned action a similar
distinction in goal acts and instrumental acts can be made. This
distinction has been made in a preliminary way by Thibaut and Kelley
(1959: 11).
Goal acts are then to be defined as "acts which by performing lead to
a state of the organism which is desirable for the actor and which
makes that the goal ceases to exist'. Pure consumption is such a goal
act. Instrumental acts are 'acts that are performed in order to reach a
goal, which in itself remains after the performance of this act*. It is
obvious that the two types of acts are ideal types. 'Pure' goal acts or
instrumental acts will be quite rare. Many acts will be directed at
subgoals and contain varying degrees of both goal and instrumental
elements. The dominance of goal and instrumental aspects is relevant.
Whether an act is predominantly a goal act pr predominantly an
instrumental act is to be defined by the individual himself. Drinking
coffee without sugar may be a goal in itself, desirable for the individual.
It might also be an instrumental act if the person is doing so for dieting
reasons. Single acts, according to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), can be
either goal acts or instrumental acts. For an instrumental act there are
by definition other possible acts that lead to the same behavioral goal.
Especially in choice situations, e.g. between brands, such a situation
occurs.
4.3 Substitutabihty of acts
The stability of the relationship between the attitude and the specific
act will be influenced by the possibility to perform similar acts (Laroche
and Brisoux 1981). Substitutability refers to the degree an act can be
replaced by other acts with similar outcomes.
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If the substitutability of an act is large, then there are many acts all
possibly leading to the same valued state. The change that a 'cognitive
event' occurs, is then larger and hence the robustness of the prediction
will be lower. For instrumental acts substitutability refers to the possi-
bility to perform other acts that lead to the same goal. This is referred
to by Abelson (1978) as equifinality. For goal acts substitutability refers
to their goal gradient. Tlie more similar acts are with respect to a
common goal, the better substitutes they are. For goal acts the evalua-
tion of outcome states will be of importance, i.e., if and to what extent
a goal is achieved and whether other goals are in conflict at the same
time. For instrumental acts the costs of performing an act, the behav-
ioral costs, in relation to the valued outcomes are relevant.
The same act can be both a goal act and an instrumental act, e.g.
drinking coffee without sugar. The relevance of behavioral costs for the
performance of an act will thus depend on the individual's intention. In
the following sections this point will be elaborated.
5. Behavioral costs
From an economic standpoint criticism has been formulated on the
attitude behavior debate.
As measurement of attitudes doesn't seem to cath the relevant (non-zero)
opportunity costs of an action, it cannot be used as a reliable predictor
of behavior (Meyer 1982: 88).
Two elements form the basis of this criticism:
(1) In order to behave an individual has to make use of his behavioral
resources (sacrifice);
(2) For each act there is a comparable act which produces similar
outcomes (as advocated in the previous section this is relevant for
instrumental acts) (opportunity costs).
The choice of an act to reach the goal that governs* the behavioral field
will thus be a function of the expected relative outcomes and the
relative costs of acts. The beliefs times evaluation model expresses the
expected outcomes of an act. There may be considerable differences
between alternative acts with respect to the costs the individual has to
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incur to perform the act in a certain context. In a buying situation these
costs are primarily of a financial nature, the price to be paid. In
choosing between different actions the costs to perform an act, the
behavioral costs, will be traded off against the expected outcomes. Such
a translation of economic concepts to psychological phenomena is
becoming normal practice when explaining the effects of reinforcement
schedules in animal psychology (Lea 1978, 1981; Rachiin et al. 1976;
Rachlin et al. 1980). However for human behavior a psychological
conceptualization of traditional economic concepts such as scarcity and
costs is rarely discussed (Brock 1968; Verhallen 1982a). Only in the
social exchange theory (Homans 1958, 1961) an attempt has been made
to apply economic principles to explain social behavior. It is argued
that although it seems difficult to apply the economic principles of
maximizing utilities to social exchange as social benefits have no exact
price, it is worthwhile to do so (Homans 1961: 72). In the traditional
economic theory of consumer demand as stated by Slutzky and Hicks
(Hicks 1959), a confrontation of financial means, that is price and
budged on the one hand and the preference for goods on the other
hand, leads to the optimal choice. In some modern economic theories,
time has been added as a scarce resource (Becker 1976). That is in
choosing between goods the individual has to take both the price and
the time needed into account. We may expand this view into: in order
to perform an act an individual has to make use of the totality of his
behavioral resources at hand: his physical and psychic energy, spendind
time and possible money (Verhallen 1982b).
We may distinguish three types of behavioral costs: time costs,
psychic costs and physical costs.
A cost figure is always relative: it refers to the amount needed for a
specific act (e.g. price for a product) in relation to the amount allocated
for a specific behavioral field (e.g. money budget). We may define
behavioral costs (BC) as in formula (5):
(5)
in which
CC * Time Costs * Time needed /Time budget
PsC - Psychic Costs « Psychic demand /Mental budget
Physical Costs = Physical demand/Physical budget.
"Time needed9 refers to the expected time needed to perform the act
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under study. The psychic and/or physical demand express the per-
ceived task requirements. Psychic costs include opportunity costs, the
costs not to behave otherwise. Note, that psychic costs (Shugan 1980)
and physical costs, psychic and physical effort, are relative. This latter
characteristic has not been emphasized in other conceptions (Wofford
1982). When having to choose between different acts within a behav-
ioral field the budget available is constant, hence neutral for the
alternative acts. The preferred act will be the one which contributes the
most to the goal governing the behavioral field, relative to the behav-
ioral costs involved. We may formally express this as:
Pal - Pal = w^Oal - Oa2) - w2(BCal - BCa2)> (6)
in which
Pal - Pal « the relative preference of act 1 to act 2,
Oal ,2 « the outcome evaluation resulting from act 1 ,2,
BCal ,2 * the behavioral costs to be made for act 1 ,2,
K'J , u>2 •• weights.
So the act will be selected for which the weighted difference between
outcomes and costs is most positive. The process by which costs and
benefits are perceived and compared between alternative acts in case
more than two acts are feasible will need further exploration. Several
issues will require research attention,
(1) The perception of task demands as types of costs will be influenced
by distortive mechanisms. It is well known that the marginal utility
of marginal costs of increasing amounts eventually diminishes.
Individual differences will be of influence on the perception of costs
and outcomes and will be reflected in the weights given to dif-
ferences in outcomes and costs.
(2) The choice rule to be used by an individual may well be not an
additive linear one, other might be more realistic (Hagarty 1980).
Research on information processing shows that depending on a
variety of factors such as time pressure, number of choice alterna-
tives, formats, differences between alternatives etc. different deci-
sion rules are used, (see e.g., Tversky 1969; Wright 1974, 1975;
Bettman 1979; Wahlers 1982; Van Raaij 1983a).
It will in many instances not be necessary to measure costs and
\
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outcomes directly to ascertain whether they have an influence. We may
simply infer them from differences in choosen acts, similar to the
application of revealed preferences in micro-economics. If all potential
acts have negative results (e.g. a higher cost than outcome figure) the
individual will not act, unless the preference for not acting is even lower
(Kukla 1982).
5.7. Energization, behavioral budget and behavioral stock
The question may arise, 'why not include individual social costs in a
behavioral cost figure'? Individual social costs might be expressed as a
social price divided by a social budget. Apart from the difficulty of
defining 'social price' in operational terms (Blau 1964: 94-95) the
definition of a social budget calls our attention. Suppose, you ask a
friend to do something for you inorder to reach a personal goal This, in
other words, means that you ask for the behavioral and/or financial
means of someone else to reach your goal. This exemplifies that
individuals may use a 'stock* of behavioral resources outside oneselves.
A 'behavioral stock' may be defined as 'the total of psychic and physial
capacities an individual has at this disposal'. So an individual has the
disposal of a financial, a behavioral and a social stock.
A social stock refers to the individual's position in society, one's
place in social networks. Materially it consists of the total available
social help, advise and information. A second, normative, component
of social stock refers to the social control that can be excerted on the
individual. As both the financial and social stocks are located outside
the individual, they are not considered to be of direct influence on
behavioral costs. From their total stock individuals may energize a part,
their behavioral budget. This behavioral budget expresses the magni-
tude of the goal valence of the behavioral field. The behavioral cost
formula presented earlier may be rewritten, for convenience, as:
= y/— Ps Ph \ behavioral price ( }
** \ TB ' PsB ' PhB}"" behavioral budget l }
Premack's (1971) 'theory on instrumental responses', states that the
value of a consummatory response (a goal) is to be expressed as the
total amount of instrumental responses. From this we may expect the
total budget for a behavioral category to depend on the goal impor-
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5.2. Behavioral costs: some further aspects
In formula (6) the relative benefits are computed separately from the
relative behavioral costs to determine the relative preferences for acts
within a behavioral field. This implies that costs and benefits do not
necessarily add up as is assumed in expectancy-value models. They may
be traded off or perhaps treated in a non-compensatory way. There are
several arguments that support such a separate treatment of costs and
benefits,
5.2.7. Individual versus societal consequences
For many acts consequences both for the individual as well as for the
society as a wh<51e can be identified.
Review studies on energy behavior (Winett and Neale 1979; Van
Raaij and Verhallen 1983a) show that attitudes have frequently been
emmployed in explaining and predicting energy behavior. Factor
analyses on attitude items as performed in many studies generally show
two types of factors: (1) Factors revealing energy or ecology concern or
energy related problem recognition, and (2) Factors referring to per-
sonal costs and benefits of energy saving (see e.g., Hass et al. 1975;
Seligman et al. 1978; Leonard-Barton and Rogers 1979; Verhallen and
Van Raaij 1981; Midden and Ritseina 1983).
These structural analyses on (attitudinal) belief statements reveal
that the perceived consequences of behavior cluster together, thus are
interdependent. Some beliefs are clustered around societal conse-
quences and related to reaching a certain goal e.g., longer lasting energy
resources. Other beliefs are connected to certain personal consequences,
e.g., monetary gain, loss of comfort or are related to the usage of certain
instruments, e.g. spending time; money or effort, to reach these goals,
by actually saving energy. This distinction between goal and instrumen-
tal beliefs reflects a means-end distinction which can be made in the
functions of attitudes (Katz 1960; Lutz 1981). In this example part of
the positive consequences, benefits are collective and located outside
the individual. The costs, mostly behavioral costs, are for the individ-
ual.
This distinction between individual costs and societal benefits makes
it possible and desirable to use them as separately studied predictors of
ecological behavior. Adding both factors leads to obscuring the dif-
ferential weights individuals may attach to individual costs and societal
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benefits. A score resulting from the summated belief x evaluations may
not reflect "different costs-benefits structures and hence different attitu-
dinal change possibilities.
5.2.2. Time dimension
Thaler (1980: 56) makes a distinction between positive and negative
investment goods. A positive investment good is a good whose benefits
accrue later than their costs, such as education. A negative investment
good has an opposite time structure. In this terminology energy con-
servation is a positive investment good. We might hypothesize that the
consistency of attitude-behavior relationships depends for a large part
on the time structure of costs and benefits.
Two time structure elements are relevant: the time order of costs and
benefits and the proximity in time of future behavior.
Time order. People may be * trapped' (Platt 1973) into performing
behavior with positive consequences coming first or reversely avoid
behavior that has behavioral costs coming first.
For example, Bronner (1982) reports that people travel by car
although their attitude toward travelling by train is more positive.
Several explanations can be suggested for this finding: (a) The costs
for car'trips are not as easily assessed as for trips by train. Some
behavioral costs may not have been covered in studies on travelling-
mode choice, (b) It might also be argued that behavioral costs for
taking the train, such as looking for the time table, planning ahead,
changing vehicles, etc. are coming first. Travelling by car is simply
easier to start with.
Time proximity Attitudes toward behavior that is far away in time may
be dominated by an "approach-tendency", i.e., the tendency to strive
to certain goals with specific positive outcomes or benefits. When the
time for behavioral performance is coming nearer the 'avoidance-
tendency', the costs, might become more relevant. This analogy with
"approach-avoidance* conflict situations might be useful in forming
hypotheses on the relative importance, over time, of future costs and
benefits as related to specific behavior.
5.2.3. Costs and benefits in a prospect-theoretical perspective
The prospect thoery of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) originates
from game-theoretical research. There it is consistently found that
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losses are weighted more heavily than gains. This differential weighting
might, according to Thaler (1980), be extended to costs and benefits.
The problem of what a person perceives as costs and benefits does not
yet seem to be resolved (Yates and Aronson 1983). However we may
hypothesize in similar vein that costs and outcomes, as referred to in
formulas (5) and (6), are weighted differently. In the foregoing some
dimensions were shortly introduced, in which consequences of behavior
can be projected: individuals vs. societal; time order and the time
proximity of costs and benefits. An approach disentangling behavioral




From an analysis of the behavior concept in Ajzen and Fishbein's
theory of reasoned action a distinction is made between goal and
instrumental aspects of behavior. It is further argued that these goal
and instrumental aspects stem from a person's general behavioral
intention. This implies that a consequence of behavior such as "being
tired' will' be evaluated as positive or negative (cost or benefit) de-
pending on the act. As a consequence of 'running to catch a train9 it
will generally be evaluated more negatively than as a consequence of
'jogging'. A typical evaluation statement from Ajzen and Fishbein's
theory such as:
being tired is:_ _ _ _ _ _ _
very good very bad
should be made act specific:
being tired after jogging is:
" + 3 + 2 + 1 0 ^l ^2 ^3
very good very bad
A similar suggestion has been by Ahtola (1977) with respect to 'motiva-
tion to comply'.
As positive and negative outcomes will be weighted differently, as
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discussed earlier, costs and positive outcomes should be treated sep-
arately.
A more general implication from the analysis here refers to the
relationship between concepts in the Ajzen and Fishbein model. The
assumption that affect is determined by the summated beliefs, cogni-
tions, is brought into another perspective. Recently, the assumption
that affect follows cognition, as implied in the Fishbein model, is
seriously doubted (Zajonc 1980; Zajonc and Markus 1982; Wright
1981; Bettman 1981; Kroeber-Riel 1983). Van Raaij (1983b) argues
that a primary, general affect is followed by cognitive elaborations
which leads to a secondary, revised affect.
Research on halo effects show that a general attitude toward a
certain behaviof has an influence on the beliefs and the evaluations
associated with those beliefs (Johansson et al. 1976; Beckwith and
Lehmann 1976; Laroche 1978). The introduction of the behavioral field
concept implies a goal setting reflecting a general affect or attitude
toward performing behavior within a behavioral category.
The performance of specific acts is dominated by cost-outcome
considerations which in our analysis do not need to include attitudes or
affects nor need a linear compensatory decision rule. This is in line with
the findings of e.g. Lastovicka and Bonfield (1982) 'Do consumers have
brand attitudes?'. In our analysis they do not need to develop affects in
an instrumental situation for (highly) substitutable choice alternatives.
The choice will be determined by cost aspects, price and convenience.
Foxall (1984) holds a similar position. He advocates, for consumer
choice settings, the replacement of an attitude, as a supposed inner
latent process, by the adoption of a research pardigm in which situa-
tional factors, especially the contingencies of reinforcement which
inhere in them, can be studied.
The approach advocated here stresses the importance of studying
acts from a broader perspective. By starting from behavioral fields in
contrast to starting from acts, "other9 variables such as "knowledge9 and
"acceptance of responsibility" find a more natural place. Next to the
aforementioned, other variables such as "vested interest' (Sivacek and
Crano 1982) can be incorporated. This latter concept refers to the
behavioral cost component. "Vested interest' might be considered to be
a "proxy* for the "behavioral budget' allocated to a behavioral field. A
more parsimonious conceptualization of attitude-behavior relationships
might be attained.
112 T.M M Verhallen , R.G M Pieters / Attitude theory
6.2. General discussion
In this article an attempt is made to express the economic cost concept
in behavioral terms. The relevance of a behavioral cost concept for
attitude-behavior theorizing has been discussed. Elaborating this behav-
ioral cost approach might shed new light on the person by situation
debate. We might hold that situational changes can be reflected in
financial, behavioral and social prices, while personal goals and values
can be reflected in the behavioral budgets allocated to specific behav-
ioral fields. Behavioral budget mixes of different individuals may reflect
their personal capacities and interests in different behavioral fields.
The question can be raised whether the term social stock relates to
the "motivation to comply" concept from Ajzen and Fishbein. It might
be hypothesized that persons with a large social stock have more
freedom to deviate from social norms. The problem related to this topic
is how to operationalize the concepts introduced here. Verhallen and
De Nooij (1982) follow a conjoint analysis procedure to capture the
essence of retail mix sensitivity, that may be considered as a behavioral
budget mix for a specific behavioral category, daily shopping. This does
not exclude that other measurement procedures can be used.
Goal importance or the attractiveness of the valued state is said to
determine, the behavioral budget.
The more important the goal, the larger the behavioral budget
allocated to this goal. On the other hand, Brehm et al. (1983) argue that
the more difficult an outcome is to attain, the more it is perceived as
attractive. Brock's commodity theory (Brock 1968) might also be said to
specify the cost-value hypothesis in this order. In the price-quality
research tradition, starting with Sdtovsky (1945), price is found to
indicate quality (see e.g., Gabor and Granger 1966; Taylor and Wills
1970). The relation of costs and value, whether they are financial
and/or behavioral, is so entangled that the order of causation may
depend to a large extent on the task definition in the behavioral setting
under study.
In some situations all cues related to intrinsic and/or extrinsic
behavioral costs will be used by the individual to infer the relative value
of alternatives e.g. in brand choice situations. In other situations,
personal goals will determine the amount of budget and individual will
allocate. This "causal order" discussion resembles the revived discussion
on the order of affects and cognitions (Zajonc 1980; Zajonc and
Markus 1982; Van Raaij 1983b.)
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After the ̂ above discussion we feel that it is premature to abandon
Ajzen and Fishbein's reasoned action model as some argue (Sarver
1983). Attitude theory can be enriched by including concepts that
reflect the limitations put by individual resources (Meyer 1982). A
behavioral cost concept has that potential.
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